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Atlantic Bibliography

Coombes, David, Editor. *The Power of the Purse, A Symposium on the Role of European Parliaments in Budgetary Decisions*. New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1976, 394 pp. This is a collection of papers presented at a symposium during which a group of European academics and members of government discussed the "power of the purse,"—the role of parliaments in budgetary matters at the European Community and national governmental levels. The book presents historical and legal background data relating to parliamentary control of the budget for Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and West Germany.

Free, Lloyd A. *Critical Choices for Americans*. Volume III: *How Others See Us*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 109 pp. Leaders and peoples of Western Europe, the Americas, and Japan were asked their opinions on the future of the United States and the world. The survey also investigated attitudes toward the United States. The results are not always what Americans like to think, and many things taken for granted are proven not true. The book provides the means for greater understanding of the concerns that motivate other people and other nations in an interdependent world where the problems of one nation are the problems of all. (see p. 89)

Harriman, Averell and Abel, Elie. *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin*. New York: Random House, 1976. A solid, well-documented memoir of Averell Harriman's days as a "special envoy," 1941-46. He writes of the great events of this period from a unique vantage point, and even though he was on the front line, Harriman refrains from hindsight conclusions about the origins of the Cold War.

Long, Franklin A. and Rathjens, George W., Editors. *Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1976, 222 pp. A volume of twelve essays on the interconnections between arms control and international political relations, crisis stabilization and military weapons development.

Mally, Gerhard. *Interdependence*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, published for the Atlantic Council of the United States, 1976, 223 pp. An assessment of global and regional interdependence. The author states that interdependence has reached its comparatively highest degree in the Atlantic area where the problem of effectively managing it has become the principal challenge to Western political leaders.

Monroe, Wilbur F. *The New Internationalism, Strategy and Initiatives for U.S. Foreign Economic Policy*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976, in press. The author states that United States foreign policy is currently being tested by demands and challenges of Third World countries and détente. He conducts a knowledgeable investigation, by blocs of countries, into what a comprehensive foreign economic policy for this country should be.

How Others See Us

By *Lloyd A. Free*

1. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ORIENTATIONS

When asked with which nations and international organizations their own country should cooperate very closely, it turned out that, apart from the United Nations, the Canadians focused primarily on Western Europe and the United States, but also gave attention very broadly to all other parts of the world.

Japanese orientations were much more severely restricted primarily, along with the United Nations, to America and mainland China, with very little concern for other Asian countries or regional organizations.

In contrast, in addition to the United Nations, the primary concentration of the Mexicans and Brazilians was on their own region of Latin America, with the United States distinctly subordinated.

Similarly, the British, French, Germans, and Italians as a group placed primary importance on the European Economic Community and countries in Western Europe, with the United States and NATO in second place, and the United Nations third. In fact, if faced with a choice between closer relations with other Western European countries or America, all samples with the exception of the British public, but including the British elite, indicated they would choose their neighbors rather than their more distant cousin.

On a comparative basis, the Canadians were way out front in number of references to close cooperation with the United States and NATO. Not too far behind came the Germans, with the British in third place. The Italians came in a not very impressive fourth, with the French far in the rear. In the other three countries surveyed (where mentions of NATO were inappropriate because they were not members), the Japanese and Mexicans seemed to have close cooperation with America on their minds with about the same intensity as the Italians, while the Brazilians exhibited about as low a degree of concern in this respect as did the French.

2. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

There was a virtual standoff in the Western European countries surveyed as to whether the basic interests of the United States and those of the Common Market countries are "fairly well in agreement" or "rather different," with the French particularly thinking

they are different and the Italians believing in above average proportions that they are compatible.

As to relations between America and the Common Market countries, plurality sentiment by a small margin was in favor of closer ties. The Italians and particularly the British were preponderantly of this opinion, but the French thought the current degree of intimacy is already "about right." The Germans were almost evenly divided on this issue. Again with considerable variations, the preponderant guess was that, in the future, relations between the Common Market and America would, in fact, remain about as they now are, rather than becoming closer.

The Western Europeans tended to feel that their basic interests and Japan's are "rather different," and the predominant belief was that current relationships are "about right," although a substantial proportion thought they are "not close enough." The Japanese agreed that there is no very positive mutuality of interests but a sizable majority, nevertheless, wanted closer ties with the Common Market.

Majorities of the Canadian samples believed their basic interests and those of the EEC are at least "fairly well in agreement" and that their relationships should become closer.

The British, French, Germans, and Italians felt that the basic interests of the various members of the EEC as a whole are only slightly in agreement at the present time. Nevertheless, there was very strong sentiment, even among the British, to the effect that continuing participation in the Common Market would be beneficial to their respective countries. In fact, all of them, including the British, favored by large majorities further steps to integrate Western Europe. With the British opposed, a plurality of the French public and large majorities of all the other samples would be willing to go so far as creating a political federation of Western Europe with a central government having the final authority.

3. GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND AMERICAN CORPORATIONS

USIA data show that, in general, attitudes towards the United States were high between 1961 and 1965, very low during 1967 and 1968, and mixed (some high, some low) from 1969 to 1972. Our current surveys show that mixed evaluations continued to prevail at the end of 1974.

To start with, except for the Italian public, at the abstract level, opinions of "the United States, its policies, and actions" at the time of our surveys were unfavorable in the case of all samples, elites and publics, and especially adverse among the French, Japanese, and to a slightly lesser extent the Canadians.

In terms of the image of the United States, there was a virtual stalemate between positive and negative factors, although the total picture was greatly improved compared to highly adverse results obtained in most of the countries covered in 1968.

Nevertheless, except among the French, feelings about mutuality of interests with America, which are far more important in influencing national policies and behavior than mere "popularity," were definitely positive in all the countries surveyed, and especially so in Britain, Italy, Germany, and Canada. In line with this, preponderant sentiment was to the effect that it would be beneficial to the countries concerned to cooperate with the United States in dealing with world scarcities and high prices of oil and other raw materials.

The predominant view in the case of every sample was that current closeness of relations with the United States is "about right," although substantial minorities of both samples among the Mexicans, Brazilians, Japanese, and the Italian elite felt that their country's ties with America are already "too close." Looking to the future, most samples saw their relationship with America remaining "about the same," but preponderantly both samples in Mexico and the public samples in Italy and Brazil saw ties becoming closer, contrary to their wishes.

The views of the Canadian and French publics were that the operations of American businesses and industries within their own countries are harmful. The Canadian elite, however, along with both samples in Japan and Germany, tended to straddle the fence on this issue. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the prevailing opinion among the British, Brazilians, Mexicans and Italians was that American corporations are positively beneficial to their own national interests.

4. AMERICA'S INTERNATIONAL ROLE, OBJECTIVES, AND LEADERSHIP

In an across-the-board sense, there was a complete stalemate between positive and negative views as to "the role the United States is playing in international affairs and on the world scene generally at the present time." Both British samples and the Italian public tended to be favorable; the Mexicans tended toward the unfavorable side, and the ratings among the Japanese and French were definitely adverse. The results from the rest of the samples were, in effect, neutral.

Nevertheless, on a question asking whether the United States is genuinely concerned about the welfare of other nations or only about advancing its own interests in the world, preponderant views were comfortably generous. Majorities in most countries of both publics and to an even greater extent elites felt that America is motivated by

the good of the world or by a combination of this and the advancement of its own interests. Only in Mexico and Brazil did majorities point solely to the entirely selfish goal of advancing American interests.

It was the belief of the elites that the principal objectives or goals the United States is trying to attain at present are clustered around maintaining or increasing its own power (political, economic, military, and in general), plus seeking world peace and the reduction of tensions.

Asked to what extent the United States really tries to understand and take into account their own country's best interests, the replies from the French sample's were highly adverse, with the Japanese and Canadians, along with the Brazilian elite, less so. But both samples of the Germans, British, and Mexicans, plus the Italian public, gave preponderantly favorable replies.

The kinds of American policies and actions elite respondents felt would be in the best interests of their own countries were varied but tended to cluster especially around economic matters: improving the world economic and monetary situation, on the one hand, and bettering economic relations with their own countries or regions, on the other.

Majority sentiment among both elites and publics was to the effect that, at the present time, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are not excellent nor good, but "only fair," showing that the bulk of respondents do not consider "détente" something to be heavily relied on, as yet at least. But all concerned saw future relations as either remaining about the same or improving, so clearly did not expect any crunch between the two superpowers over the next few years. Along this line, only the French and Mexicans believed there was any significant danger the United States would sell out its allies or neighbors to bring off better deals with the Soviets.

Asked how much confidence they had in the ability of the United States to provide wise leadership in dealing with world problems, the ratings were remarkably favorable in Mexico, Germany, and Great Britain; moderately so in Italy, Canada, and among the Japanese elite; and adverse only in Brazil and France.

The tendency everywhere was for the elites to feel that the United States will go on playing a vigorous role on the international front, rather than reverting to some kind of isolationism. With the exception of the French and the Mexicans, all other elites applauded this.

Asked whether they would like to see the influence of the United States in their own parts of the world increase, decrease, or remain at the present level, in the Americas the elites in Canada, Mexico, and

especially Brazil opted for a weakened role, with the publics in those countries splintered on this issue. In Western Europe, the Italian elite preponderantly wanted the influence of the United States to decrease, and the French elite was split almost evenly between "decrease" and "present level." However, the predominant opinion among all the other European samples was that American influence should remain at about the present level. The Japanese agreed, but with less conviction, about U.S. influence in Asia.

5. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA

Opinions of the Soviet Union, its policies and actions were decidedly adverse in all the countries surveyed—far more so than opinions of the United States. The overall averages in the case of mainland China were also on the negative side but to a much lesser extent. In fact China nosed out the United States among the combined elites and equalled the United States in the case of the publics. The general conclusion is that none of these three powers can be considered popular in any affirmative way.

Feelings of mutuality of interests with the Soviet Union were also conspicuously lacking. The Japanese (the only country in which the issue was raised) also felt that their interests and those of China were either "rather different" or "very different." In both respects, the United States came out far ahead in all countries surveyed.

Nevertheless, huge majorities of both the Japanese elite and public were in favor of closer relations with China. On an across-the-board basis the combined elites in the other countries leaned toward the view that current relations with China are "not close enough," while the publics tended more to think such relations are already "about right."

In the related question about the Soviet Union, while the feeling that relations with the USSR are not close enough proved to be very considerable, the predominant preference in all countries but one tended to be that the present situation is "about right." The exception was the Japanese, a sizable majority of whom wanted more intimate ties with the Soviet Union.

In contrast, there was a considerable reaching out, particularly among the elites, for closer relations with the Eastern European nations other than the Soviet Union.

Confidence in the ability of the Soviet Union to provide wise leadership in dealing with world problems was very decidedly wanting among both elites and publics, and the scores in the case of confidence in the Chinese were even more adverse—in both cases vastly below the affirmative ratings given the United States in this regard.

6. POWER AND IMPORTANCE

Asked to rate various nations in terms of power and importance, the various respondents saw no meaningful upward shift in the standing of the United States either from ten years ago to the present, nor from the present to ten years from now. In contrast, the present rating assigned the Soviet Union was very much higher than the past, but few of the samples expected the Russians to enhance their position significantly further over the next ten years.

Both samples in Italy, Mexico, Brazil, and Japan, plus the French elite thought the United States was still ahead of the USSR at present; but both samples in Britain, Germany, and Canada, joined by the French public, felt that a state of equivalence has already been achieved by the Soviets. Furthermore, except for the Brazilian public, all concerned prophesized equality by ten years from now, if not already today.

This prospect proved to be a welcome one, however, since a preponderance of all samples except the British public thought it preferable for America and the Soviet Union to be about equal in power, rather than for the United States to maintain superiority.

The present power and importance ratings assigned mainland China, Japan, and the Common Market countries as a whole were all about the same and much lower than those of the United States or the Soviet Union. It was anticipated that all would increase in power and influence over the next ten years. Nevertheless, it was expected that all of the three, notably including China, while constituting about mutually equal significant power centers, would nevertheless remain significantly below the two superpowers.

In rating the power and importance of their own countries, the British and Italians saw a major drop over the past ten years and, although expecting some improvement in the future, did not think that ten years from now they would even be up to where they had been ten years ago. The French saw no substantial increment in their own power and influence. However, all the other samples envisioned substantial, and in some cases gigantic enhancements in their country's relative standing. Nevertheless, none of them, either as of the present or the future, placed themselves in a position even remotely approaching that of America or the Soviet Union.

In general, all the samples surveyed wanted their country to gain more power and importance in the world by playing a more active role and taking on more responsibilities. Some hesitation on this score was expressed by the Japanese public, however, and a great deal by both samples in Germany.

7. WAR, ALLIANCES, DEFENSE

With the somewhat puzzling exception of the Brazilians and Mexicans, who perceived considerable danger, the rest of our samples had relatively little fear that a war would break out within the next ten years that would bring sorrow or suffering to their own country.

There was even less belief in the likelihood of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, all samples without exception thought that, if such a nuclear confrontation did occur, the lives of most of the people in their respective countries would be at stake. Variations in the degree of reactions seemed to hinge on geographic proximity to the United States: the countries in the Americas were the most fearful of such devastation; the Western Europeans next; the far-away Japanese least of all.

All samples in the member states of the Atlantic Alliance expressed the belief that it is important to their own countries to preserve unity and strength of NATO. The elites in both Western Europe and Canada believed, however, that the condition of NATO at the present time is not good, let alone excellent, but only fair.

Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion was that the military strength of NATO should simply be kept at the present level, although sizable minorities in most countries opted for an increase. In contrast, significantly minority proportions of the Italian and especially French elites were in favor of actually decreasing NATO's clout, or even ending the arrangement altogether.

Most of those who favored beefing up NATO were willing for their own countries to contribute to the cost; but the proportions approving both increasing NATO's strength and contributing to the cost came to less than one-quarter of the total elite samples in the NATO countries surveyed.

Only the British and German elites were really disturbed about the prospects of a reduction in the strength of American forces in Europe. Both Canadian samples, along with the French and Italian elites, registered only very moderate concern, while the French and Italian publics appeared largely apathetic about this issue. When it came to the question, posed only to the NATO members' elites, of their respective countries making up more of the costs in order to keep the level of American forces in Europe up to par, the only real real majority in favor was to be found among the Germans. Majorities of the Italians and Canadians were definitely opposed, with the British splitting 50-50, and the French sharply divided.

In short, while the Western Europeans and Canadians said they were in favor of NATO and believed in its importance, this feeling was not strong enough to make them eager to take on new financial

burdens either to strengthen NATO in a direct sense, or to maintain the present level of the U.S. contribution.

Except among the French public, majority support was strong in the case of all elite and public samples in Western Europe to go further in developing strictly European collective defense arrangements. In the case of both samples in Britain and Germany, along with the Italian public, majorities among those who felt this way believed it should be done in association with the United States. On the other hand, the Italian elite and French public opted predominantly for going ahead independently of the United States, with the French elite practically split down the middle. Nevertheless the predominant general feeling among the advocates of further European collective defense arrangements was that these moves should be made in association with America.

A majority of the public and especially the elite in Japan was in favor of continuing the Mutual Security Pact with the United States. Also, majorities, especially high in the case of the public, opposed Japan developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.

On defense spending as a whole, the prevailing sentiment in general was in favor of maintaining the present level and opposed to increases, except in the case of the Mexican public which opted for a stronger military. The view that such expenditures should actually be decreased proved to be preponderant, however, among both public and elite samples in Italy and France, the Brazilian elite, and the Japanese public.

With the exception of the Japanese, who were lukewarm on the subject, an amazingly high proportion of all samples felt they could rely on the United States to come to their defense with military force in the event of aggression by the Soviets. This was true even of the French, despite the fact that their country had long since withdrawn from NATO's integrated military-command structure and expelled its headquarters. The astronomical confidence displayed on this issue by the Canadians, Mexicans, and British was well-high incredible at a time when talk about Americans reverting in some degree to isolationism is having a good deal of currency.

8. CONCERNS, ASPIRATIONS, FEARS, AND WELL-BEING

When asked systematically about how worried and concerned they were about a long list of problems, respondents everywhere placed the main emphasis upon economic ones: inflation, unemployment, energy shortages, and economic and business conditions generally. Next in order came concern about reducing both water and air pollution.

Among the several international items, the highest ratings were given to maintaining respect for one's own country abroad, food and oil shortages or high prices in various parts of the world, and maintaining close relations with the United States. The lowest scores of all were in connection with improving relations with the Soviet Union and China, and particularly concern about the future of Indochina and Southeast Asia.

When asked the wishes and hopes embodied in their own concepts of the best possible situation for their country, and the worries and fears illustrative of the worse possible situation, the emphases again were placed on economics: standard of living, employment, economic stability and control of inflation. References to political and social matters tended to be low, except that disunity and political instability were of particular concern to the French and Canadians.

Mentions of peace as a national aspiration and war as a fear were at the lowest ebb ever recorded in the surveys the Institute for International Social Research has conducted in all parts of the world over the last twenty years.

Our respondents tended to be overwhelmingly aware of the need to regulate both population and economic growth on a worldwide basis, but were generally opposed to making such limitations in their own countries.

In terms of national well-being, the Canadians and Germans felt their respective countries to be the best off, and the British and Italians the worst off. Furthermore, the latter two have had a sense of severe national deterioration over the preceding five years. The Brazilians, in contrast, exhibited strong feelings both of progress and of optimism, and were joined in being optimistic by the Mexicans. In sum, however, the Brazilians and to a lesser extent the Mexicans excepted, the mood that has emerged from these surveys tends to be gloomy, especially when compared to the bouncy sense of national progress and the feelings of optimism that have customarily emerged from most similar studies in recent years.

This reflects, no doubt, an acute awareness of the vast problems confronting the world and all of its nations at the present time. □

Summary of "Critical Choices for Americans" (see p. 125).